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1 
PLAYING FOR SOCIAL EQUALITY 
 
Abstract  This paper claims that the protection of children’s capability for play is a central social-
political goal. It provides the following three-premise argument in defence of this claim: (i) we have strong and 
wide-ranging normative reasons to be concerned with clusters of social deficiency; (ii) particular fertile 
functionings play a key role for tackling clusters of social deficiency; and finally (iii) the capability for childhood 
play is a crucial, ontogenetic prerequisite for the development of those particular fertile functionings. Thus, in 
so far as we consider it a central political goal to tackle social deficiency, we should be concerned with protection 
of childhood play capability. This conclusion raises new insights on the importance—for global development 
policy as well as for welfare states’ aim to secure social justice—of protecting children’s capability to engage in 
playful activities. 
 
Key Words: Play; Childhood; Social Inequality; Capability; Social Policy. 
 
 
 
Why does the baby crow with pleasure? Why does the gambler lose himself in his 
passion? Why is a huge crowd roused to frenzy by a football match? This intensity 
of, and absorption in, play finds no explanation in biological analysis. Yet in this 
intensity, this absorption, this power of maddening, lies the very essence, the 
primordial quality of play. Nature, so our reasoning mind tells us, could just as 
easily have given her children all those useful functions of discharging 
superabundant energy, of relaxing after exertion, of training for the demands of 
life, of compensating for unfulfilled longings, etc., in the form of purely 
mechanical exercises and reactions. But no, she gave us play, with its tension, its 
mirth, and its fun (Huzinga, 1949: 2-3). 
Johan Huizinga 
 
In this article1, I shall defend the central political importance of the protection of the capability 
for play in childhood. While many philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists have studied 
the phenomenon of child play, its different forms, and its value, only few have investigated its 
status as a political and social good. Most notably, the capability for play is included by Martha 
Nussbaum in her well-known list of central human capabilities (2000: 78-80; 2011: 33-34). But 
in a political-philosophical context, the play-item on Nussbaum’s list has been much criticized 
either for being less important and hence less defendable than the other listed items, or for 
                                                            
1 The argument in this paper has evolved over many years and has improved from very many comments and 
suggestions. I owe thanks to Serena Olsaretti, Paula Casal, Juliana Bidadanure, Andrew Walton, Anca Gheaus, 
David Axelsen, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Siba Harb, Isa Triffan, Tim Meijers, Andreas Albertsen, Andrée-Anne 
Cormier, Nicolás Brando, Søren Midtgaard, Jens Thaysen, and Mathilde Cecchini. I am especially grateful to two 
anonymous reviewers for great comments that has really improved the general argument. A special thanks to 
Jonathan Wolff and Andrew Williams for helping me understand the complexity of the issue in question.  
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2 
being a clear expression of Nussbaum’s perfectionism (Claassen and Düwell, 2013; Claassen, 
2011; 2017; Nelson, 2008; Den Uyl and Rasmussen, 2009).     
Here I defend the central importance play has as a political and social good. My central 
claim is that the capability for childhood play has ontogenetic importance for the 
development of other capabilities that are essentially necessary for enabling people to cope 
with social deficiencies. Much political theory has in recent years increasingly paid attention 
to the importance of targeting clusters of disadvantage or deficiencies, not least due to the 
heavily growing empirical evidence that social disadvantages—such as ill health; 
unemployment; low income; social exclusion—are intertwined (Marmot, 2004; Wilkinson 
and Pickett, 2010; Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007). Thus, the question of how to target deficiencies 
has taken on crucial political importance. Despite the increasing interest in how to target the 
clustering of disadvantage, very few theorists have given much thought to the capability for 
childhood play. This is surprising since numerous studies within child psychology and 
pediatrics support the intuition that childhood play could be a key player as a development 
tool for providing individuals with the necessary skills to cope with social disadvantages. At 
this point, however, this argument is yet to be unfolded. This is my modest purpose in this 
article. 
My argument is quite simple. It involves three premises. (i) The normative case for 
tackling clusters of deficiencies premise claims that we have strong and wide-ranging 
normative reasons to be concerned with instances of clusters of deficiency—that is, where 
people are worse off than they should be on several separate but interrelated social 
dimensions. There are two strands of justice theory that ground this premise.2 The first one is 
a pluralist sufficientarian strand. It holds that there exists several functionings that are of 
central importance to justice such that any deficiency in any of these is necessarily unjust. For 
this reason, we should be especially concerned with instances of clusters of such deficiency. 
Within this strand of theory, I shall take my cue from Martha Nussbaum’s well-known list of 
central human capabilities although, importantly, one need not agree with Nussbaum to 
accept my argument. The second strand is social-egalitarian. It holds that one primary focus 
of social justice should be on cases in which deficiencies cluster, because clusters of 
deficiency—such as the clustering of inadequate health; lack of education; unemployment; 
low societal status—systematically creates and upholds social inequality. On this account, and 
contrary to the pluralist sufficientarian strand, justice need not be disturbed by singular 
instances of deficiency, if for example instances of deficiencies are more or less equally 
                                                            
2 I am here setting aside subjectivist-based egalitarian reasoning, such as for example the widely shared equal 
opportunity for welfare view following Richard Arneson’s influential writings (Arneson, 1989). I do this because 
that I think the political argument I want to make is most strongly formulated upon objectivist grounds. 
However, the normative case for tackling clusters of deficiency could also be justified upon subjectivist 
reasoning. While this might give rise to a philosophical debate about whether subjectivist or objectivist views 
are the most theoretically plausible grounds for theories of justice, the fact that both lines of reasoning supports 
this first premise simply strengthens the political argument I wish to make here.      
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distributed, but clusters of deficiency inevitably represent injustices, as their presence signify 
the stark and complex vulnerability of the worse off in society. Thus, egalitarians say, we 
should be concerned with clusters of deficiency. 
(ii) The fertile-functioning premise says that some human functionings have a special 
fertile impact on the capability to achieve other central human functionings and, 
consequently, these functionings play a key role for tackling clusters of deficiencies. (iii) The 
ontogenetic value of “play” premise claims that not only is “play” a fertile functioning, it is a 
crucial prerequisite for the development of other fertile functionings due to its importance 
for successful development of central cognitive and social abilities. It follows from accepting 
these three premises that the protection of the capability for childhood play is of core value 
and should be considered a central political goal. This conclusion raises new insights on the 
importance—for global development policy as well as for welfare states’ aim to secure social 
justice—of protecting children’s capability to engage in playful activities. These insights 
inform us how to design political arrangements and public institutions such as the health 
system and the educational institutions. 
 
The pluralist sufficientarian strand: Nussbaum’s central human capabilities 
Through her many highly esteemed and comprehensive writings, Martha Nussbaum has 
provided and defended, almost unchangeably, the same list of central human capabilities as 
an index of universal human entitlements. Although Nussbaum’s list is fleshed out within 
Sen’s framework of the capability approach, and hence the language of capabilities and 
functionings is key to understanding the content of the listed items, she insists on describing 
them as human entitlements (Nussbaum 2000: 81-82). This is important, because the listed 
capabilities are what all individual persons’ can reasonably demand from others in the name 
of justice. The list contains ten items: (1) Life; (2) Bodily Health; (3) Bodily Integrity; (4) Senses, 
Imagination and Thought; (5) Emotions; (6) Practical Reason; (7) Affiliation (A: other-
regarding; B: self-regarding); (8) Other Species; (9) Play; and (10) Control over One’s 
Environment (A: political; B: material) (Nussbaum, 1992; 2000: 78-80; 2001: 416-418; 2006: 76-
78; 2007: 21-24; 2011: 33-34). The listed items are in the form of functionings—thus, 
achievements of well-being function—but importantly, the entitlements in regard to the 
elements are in terms of capabilities understood as the effective freedom or real opportunity 
to achieve these functionings. This distinction is fundamental in the writings of any capability 
theorist and is of central moral and political importance because it implies that we need to 
seriously consider people’s individual freedom, agency and personal choice; not only the 
enhancement of their well-being. For example, the functioning of my bodily health might very 
well be worsened through my choice not to take my daily doses of medicine or my choice to 
enjoy a fatty high-carb breakfast instead of my regular oatmeal with fresh fruit. But 
importantly, my capability to achieve bodily health is the same, assuming that the choice is 
effectively mine. 
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Building a theory of entitlements on capabilities rather than functioning achievements 
is crucial in order to take proper stock of individual choice and responsibility and to 
appropriately accommodate the threat of state-paternalism. This point may well be taken as 
“the standard move” for capability theorists, which Rutger Claassen rightfully argues will not 
make the theory immune to paternalism altogether (Claassen 2014: 57-73). This point aside, if 
entitlements are in the form of “freedom to choose” instead of “no choice at all,” the standard 
move does seem to take the edge of the paternalist fear. 
The foundation of Nussbaum’s list is grounded in the normative belief that the listed 
items are constitutive of the good or dignified human life. That is, any state of being is 
essentially not to be counted as a human life in dignity without these central capabilities. This 
is, no doubt, a controversial claim. And Nussbaum is carefully explicit about the list not being 
a conclusive, full-fledged account of human nature and also not a complete theory of justice. 
Rather, the list is meant as a deliberative point of reference from which theoretical, public and 
practical elaboration may take off.  
There are a number of issues one could raise against having such a list, but many of 
them becomes much less worrisome if we consider three central aspects of Nussbaum’s list. 
Firstly, the list is evaluative because it states value-judgments about human life—i.e. what a 
human person needs, constitutively, in order to lead a dignified human life. This does not 
mean that a person should not have the freedom to choose not the make use of the listed 
capabilities, because it is a list of capabilities, not functionings. Nor does it imply that having 
all these capabilities necessarily makes your life good or dignified, since it is a list of necessary, 
not sufficient, conditions for a dignified human life. What the list states, evaluatively, is that 
a human life cannot be dignified if any of these central human capabilities are absent. Since 
this is a normative point, it implies, of course, that you are allowed to disagree, but it follows 
that in doing so you must accept that the items on Nussbaum’s list do not have this 
constitutive role. Many would agree that they do.  
Second, the list is historical because it builds upon shared human experiences about 
the distinctive characteristics of humanity. This implies that the list is not derived from a 
metaphysical or physiological definition of humanity but relies on an internal-essential 
assessment of the characteristics of human life from the perspective of human beings 
(Nussbaum, 1992). In her later writings, Nussbaum emphasizes that this internal essentialism 
is compatible with Rawls’ political liberalism (Nussbaum, 2011). However, importantly, this 
does nothing to change the fact that the list is a historical standard of what a human life 
entails.  
Third and finally, the list is generic because it is meant to serve as a reference point for 
social and cultural interpretation and social deliberation and as such is open for some culture-
contextual interpretation and for further revisions based on sound argumentation and 
important new information. Though this aspect of the list is often notices by discussants, it is 
not always taken seriously. Way too often, Nussbaum’s list is interpreted as a “take it or leave 
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it” view, which in my view makes it much more controversial than it actually is. We should 
instead understand it as a suggestive point of reference to encourage further discussion about 
which deficiencies are most threatening to the dignity of human lives.  
If you agree with Nussbaum that there exist objective values that ground universal 
entitlements, and if you agree that these entitlements are important in their own right 
because of the objectivity of the value they carry, you should find it important to consider 
which of these entitlements have priority over the others. One prima facie answer to that 
question is that none of the capabilities have priority. This is an expected answer because it 
follows from the conclusion that the capabilities are objectively important in their own right 
that no theoretical priority can be given to any of the items on the list.3 That is Nussbaum’s 
initial response which she expresses in the statement that there is a “tragic aspect to any 
choice in which citizens are pushed below the threshold in one of the central areas” 
(Nussbaum, 2000: 81). However, although this statement emphasizes the important element 
of incommensurability entailed in a pluralist standard of human life—which is immanent in 
a capability theory such as Nussbaum’s—it does not imply that this standard is necessarily 
unable to give any political, prioritized guidance on how to target social deficiencies. I shall 
return to this point when I address fertile functionings. Here, it suffices to capture Nussbaum’s 
reason for being concerned with clusters of deficiency. If the central capabilities are 
incommensurable, in the way that Nussbaum believes them to be, so that no surplus in one 
area can make up for a deficit in another, yet if on the other hand deficiencies often come in 
clusters, then it becomes important how we can tackle such clusters of disadvantage. Thus, 
what Nussbaum offers is a thick conception of the content of pluralist-sufficientarian reasons 
for being concerned with clusters of deficiency. 
 
The social-egalitarian strand: the manifest-injustice thesis 
Nussbaum’s contribution has been met with much appreciation as well as critique. Many 
political theorists have taken her list to be excessively perfectionist or paternalist (Claassen, 
2014; Den Uyl and Rasmussen, 2009). Others have found it too rigid to insist on a universal 
list of capabilities because it leaves little space for individual influence over the process of 
choosing valuable functionings (Sen, 2005; Robeyns, 2005; 2011). However, her list of 
capabilities is still a central focal point in political philosophy as well as other disciplines of 
the social sciences—such as development studies; educational studies; feminism and social 
justice; and priority setting in health care. Although I am generally sympathetic to 
Nussbaum’s political theory even at the abstract philosophical level, I shall here restrict myself 
                                                            
3 Here, some would object that clearly the more basic capabilities such as Life and Health must take priority over 
more complex capabilities such as Affiliation or Practical Reason in a way similar to Maslow’s well-known 
hierarchy of necessities (Maslow 1943). While this is of course true, and Nussbaum acknowledges this, she 
maintains that the value of the separate capabilities are non-commensurable and hence cannot be ranged on 
any singular scale (Nussbaum 2000: 81). 
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to using her list of central human capabilities as it was originally meant to be used—as a 
theoretical cue for further deliberation and discussion—not as a full-fledged theory of justice 
or a universal philosophy of the good life. Thus, one need not accept Nussbaum’s view in 
general to accept my argument here. In fact, one may even reject the whole idea of an objective 
universal list of capabilities and still accept my argument. To see this, consider an alternative 
social-egalitarian type of reasoning for accepting the first premise of my argument. 
In his book, The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen suggests an alternative approach to 
thinking about justice—alternative, that is, to the most commonly used approach within 
contemporary political philosophy, which he calls “transcendental institutionalism.” His 
alternative is to make “realization-based comparisons” of justice, which involves changing the 
core research question from “what would be perfectly just institutions?”, which is the 
paramount focus for philosophers such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, to “how can 
justice be advanced?” (Sen, 2009: 9). At the heart of this approach to justice lies the core idea 
that we do not need a full-fledged theory of justice—nor do we need a complete technical 
definition of justice—in order to identify clear cases of injustice. Thus, we need not agree 
about what a distribution of relevant perfect equality is in order to see grave instances of 
inequality. Nor do we need a thick account of a sufficiency threshold, such as Nussbaum’s, in 
order to identify significant deficiencies. This sits nicely with Sen’s earlier work on the relevant 
understanding of “inequality”—in relation to his use of dominant and partial rankings for 
making interpersonal comparisons—within the capability approach (Sen, 1992).  
The same idea has more recently been proposed and formulated by Jonathan Wolff as 
“the manifest injustice thesis”, which claims that relevant injustices can be identified without 
reference to any positive theory of justice (Wolff, 2015). Wolff’s point emphasizes the 
methodological critique, which is implicit in Sen’s point, that political philosophers ought to 
be more concerned with such manifest injustices rather than with creative hypothetical 
injustices. This lays out an alternative normative reason to be concerned with clusters of 
deficiency than the sufficientarian one suggested by Nussbaum above. When deficiencies 
come in clusters, they are obvious examples of such manifest injustices, which are problematic 
on egalitarian grounds, even across disagreements on specific theories of justice. That is, these 
clusters create separate social classes and uphold grave systematic inequality between these 
classes. Thus, as I have argued so far, we have strong both pluralist sufficientarian and social-
egalitarian reasons to accept the first part of my argument, the normative case for the tackling 
clusters of deficiencies premise.  
 
The importance of fertile functionings 
What we know today from studies of social inequality is that deficiencies tend to cluster 
(Marmot, 2004; Wilkinson and Picket, 2010). This clustering is made up of a wide range of 
rather complex, intertwined relations between deficits in different social spheres, and it is 
difficult to get an overview. However, the basic idea is rather simple and intuitive. Let us take 
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one of the many possible pathways into a cluster of disadvantage. Imagine that you lose your 
current job. If you are unable to get a new job, you will have lower income. Low income and 
unemployment affect your societal status (Wilkinson and Picket, 2010). Societal status 
coincides with your level of health (Marmot, 2004). Health has a significant impact on your 
control over your environment, your job opportunities, and your opportunities to pursue 
valuable life plans in general (Daniels, 2008; Venkatapuram, 2011). 
Consequently, if we can tackle such clusters of disadvantage, we can enhance the 
capabilities and well-being for the worse off in society. As I have argued so far, we have not 
only pragmatic political but also strong and wide-ranging normative reasons to do that. Here 
Wolff and de-Shalit have introduced the very useful couple of conceptions, corrosive 
disadvantages and fertile functionings in an attempt to capture where we should target our 
efforts in social policy (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007; 2013). A disadvantage is corrosive if it is 
likely to lead to further disadvantage. Inadequate health is a disadvantage, and in many cases 
likely a corrosive disadvantage (Nielsen, 2015). Suffering from ill health critically limits your 
opportunities in other areas of life. It makes you less able to get a good education; it makes 
you less suited for the job market (Daniels, 2008: 58-59). Moreover, it may significantly 
decrease your level of security and control over your life and over your social and political 
environment (Wolff, 2009). So, in many cases health disadvantages are corrosive.  
A functioning is fertile, on the other hand, if it is likely to have positive effects on other 
functionings. Again, like inadequate health is likely a corrosive disadvantage, good health is 
very likely a fertile functioning due to its widespread, good consequences.4 In this general 
sense, corrosive disadvantages and fertile functionings may refer to the same phenomenon of 
intertwinement and thus simply be two sides of the same coin. However, there is an important 
point to distinguishing between the two. In more particular cases, the absence of a corrosive 
disadvantage does not necessarily translate nicely into a fertile functioning. Very often we 
cannot simply target corrosive disadvantages by removing the causes. That is, although ill 
health is corrosive and good health is fertile, simply getting rid of the causes of ill health is 
not necessarily the strategy that enhances functionings. As Wolff depicts, “smoking is 
corrosive—almost literally—but the absence of smoking is not fertile, in that it does not 
spread good effects elsewhere” (Wolff, 2009: 222). So, although we might treat fertile 
functionings as the opposite of corrosive disadvantages in a very general theoretical sense, it 
is important to the way we make policy to obtain a clear distinction between the two. 
                                                            
4 Fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages are technical terms purposed for theory development within 
the broad framework of the capability approach. More empirically founded readers might find an interesting 
parallel here to the measures of UK Indices of Multiple Deprivation (see Payne and Abel 2012). This is a fair 
comparison, but as my contribution here is theoretical, rather than empirical, it would be misplaced to employ 
a statistical terminology, since the theoretical applicability of the terms are broader than to this particular 
translation, and it would be especially misplaced when the theoretical terminology, as in this case, is accurate.   
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The conception of fertile functioning helps to prioritize between the functionings on 
Nussbaum’s list. Not because any of them are theoretically more important than others—as 
the incommensurability of different capabilities makes that conclusion impossible—but 
because it provides guidance to where social policy efforts can do the most good to enhance 
overall human capability. Nussbaum recognizes something similar in her discussion of some 
of the capabilities on the list. Specifically she mentions the architectonic role of affiliation and 
practical reason as these capabilities are important for organizing and pervading the others 
(Nussbaum, 2000: 82). In her later writings, she explicitly endorses and adopts Wolff and de-
Shalit’s conceptions of corrosive disadvantages and fertile functionings as a useful way to give 
priority within the list and thus serve as political guidance for social policy initiatives 
(Nussbaum, 2011: 45). 
In a similar vein, fertile functionings offer social egalitarians a straightforward way to 
oppose manifest injustices as a necessary tool for tackling systematic social inequality because 
of their potential for enhancing people’s opportunities for coping with deficiency clusters. 
Thus again, we have normative reasons from both strands of justice reasoning to care for the 
importance of fertile functionings.  
Like Nussbaum, Wolff and de-Shalit consider affiliation a central fertile functioning. 
“It serves”, they write, “as a sort of immunization in the sense that people who experience a 
high sense of affiliation are better equipped to cope with threats and risks to their 
functionings” (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 139). Their review of empirical studies suggests that 
affiliation is among the most fertile functionings and thus that our political efforts to target 
clusters of disadvantage should center on this specific capability. Other empirical studies 
provide further evidence to strengthen this conclusion. To name just of few of the numerous 
examples, Kia-Keating and Ellis show in their study of refugee children’s ability to adjust to 
and succeed in new social contexts that affiliation in terms of school belonging had a 
significant positive impact on the children’s mental health and self-efficacy and therefore 
improves their ability to do well (Kia-Keating and Ellis, 2007). Likewise, Nuttman-Shwartz 
and Dekel found that affiliation in the sense of belonging to a community was positively 
associated with a lower level of distress caused by the presence of threats and thus very likely 
fertile for a stronger ability to cope with threats (Nuttman-Shwartz and Dekel, 2009). 
Numerous other studies confirm the conclusion that affiliation has a wide range of good 
effects for people’s social capabilities, their self-perception, and their mental health in general 
(Anderman, 2002; Hagborg, 1998). Thus, the empirical evidence that affiliation is a fertile 
functioning—and that its absence should be considered a corrosive disadvantage—is 
convincingly strong. 
Wolff and de-Shalit also shed light on the fertility of the functionings of sense, 
imagination, and thought as well as control over one’s environment. In relation to the former, 
they argue that education, which is basically their (very reasonable) operationalization of this 
capability, is seemingly fertile for other valuable capabilities, especially health and 
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employment. Based on empirical evidence of the positive effects of education, they conclude 
that although it may be too strong to assume that education is necessarily a fertile functioning, 
a deficiency of sense, imagination, and thought through lack of education is evidently a 
corrosive disadvantage (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 144). In regard to latter, they argue that 
having control over one’s environment entails a number of different capabilities such as “soft 
skills”—which is a social capital version of street-smarts; a way of knowing your way around 
the social system—but also worker control and autonomy in the workplace. These entailed 
functionings have great fertile effects on other capabilities, yet, most importantly, the absence 
of having control over one’s environment seems clearly associated with further disadvantages 
and thus may reasonably be taken as a corrosive disadvantage (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 147-
148).  
Summing up, if social deficiencies cluster, this gives us normative reason—lending 
from both pluralist sufficientarian and social egalitarian strands of reasoning—to focus our 
aim of social policy on tackling these clusters. The best way to do that is to target our effort 
on preventing corrosive disadvantages and enhancing fertile functionings. Although the 
debate must go on about what the most suitable areas of deficiencies to target politically are, 
we have strong empirical support for concluding that affiliation plays a key role as a fertile 
social functioning; and that absence of sense, imagination, and thought as well as control over 
one’s environment are instances of corrosive social disadvantages. In what follows, I shall argue 
that these conclusions give us reasons to give priority to protect the capability for play for 
young children. 
 
The ontogenetic importance of play 
The literature on capabilities and social disadvantage has not paid much attention to the 
capability for play. In some cases, theorists even take this particular capability as an example 
of what should not be on the list. Rutger Claassen and Marcus Düwell argue that the choice 
of including the capability for play on the list is conveniently arbitrary, which they show by 
their case of the humorless warrior, who never laughs or has fun and is also really aggressive. 
Both aggression and humor are natural human capacities, but “nonetheless”, they say, “the 
capability to laugh is on Nussbaum’s list while the capability to fight is not” (Claassen and 
Düwell, 2013). In this section I want to defend the special importance of the capability for play. 
In her original outline of the list, Nussbaum justifies the choice to include play in the 
rather generic statement that, “inability to laugh is taken, correctly, as a sign of deep 
disturbance in an individual child; if it proves permanent, we will doubt whether the child is 
capable of leading a fully human life” (Nussbaum, 1992: 220). What Nussbaum is trying to 
establish here is that there is surely something constitutive for humanity about humor and 
the ability to laugh and to play. Historically, that is, our understanding of what a human life 
consists of must entail some version of this capability. In her later works, she emphasizes the 
importance of enjoying playful activities as a central part of a dignified childhood, which 
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unfortunately many girls living in poverty are derived off (Nussbaum, 2000: 90-91). Again, this 
rightfully stresses the constitutive role of the capability for play. I shall not object to this 
generic line of argument. It is as intuitively plausible as it is theoretically grounded. However, 
admittedly there is something peculiar about the way this reasoning works. Surely, that 
something is a sign of deep disturbance is not something we applaud, but neither does it seem 
to be the kind of reasoning that grounds a constitutive element of a fully or dignified human 
life. Having yellow-colored skin is a sign of a malfunctioning liver, which is of course critical, 
but that does not mean that having normal-colored skin is constitutive of a dignified human 
life. Clearly we need more than that inability to laugh is a symptom of disadvantage in order 
to ground the importance of the capability to play. 
Here the mechanisms of fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages can provide 
insights. As argued above we have evidence supporting our conclusion that affiliation works 
as a fertile functioning and thus takes a central place in our political efforts to target social 
deficiencies. Furthermore, we have established that the absence of sense, imagination, and 
thought as well as control over one’s environment are likely to be corrosive disadvantages. 
Now, I shall add, these three capabilities—affiliation; sense, imagination, and thought; control 
over one’s environment—are all to a significant degree developed in childhood through the 
practice of childhood play. Therefore, not only should we consider childhood play a fertile 
functioning and the absence of the capability to play for children a corrosive disadvantage, we 
should acknowledge that the fertility of this early stage capability directly conditions other 
social capabilities that are already recognized as having fertile characteristics. 
I shall provide evidence in support of this claim below. But before doing so, it will be 
worthwhile to reflect on one immediate limitation of the argument. Namely, that even if you 
accept what I argue about the early importance of play for childhood development, it does 
not follow that enhancing play is the only way to ensure this development. Imagine we have 
strong evidence that children raised by violent and abusive parents will turn out much more 
tough-skinned, robust and thus less vulnerable than children raised by caring parents. 
Certainly, although being robust might be a good thing, this would not justify that we allow 
violent parenthood. But play is different from violence in that it is a natural and necessary 
part of any childhood and a practice to which we attach value (Huizinga 1949). And even 
without this assumption about play’s non-instrumental value, there are certainly deontic 
constraints on how we can treat children that speaks in favor of the play-route (and against 
the violence-route) to this development. Hence, if play has significant instrumental 
importance for certain necessary developmental processes, then it seems straightforwardly a 
better candidate than less valuable practices. Thus, upon the argument I lay out below, I shall 
consider play a pro tanto necessary condition for the development of skills useful for tackling 
social deficiencies. 5  
                                                            
5 I am grateful to Andrée-Anne Cormier and Nicolás Brando for helping me understand the complexity and the 
richness of the issue of children’s right.  
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One might further object that this depiction of the role of play is simplistically 
overstated in that it is insensitive to the fact that children’s capability for play, even in very 
early age, also presupposes some basic capabilities—such as the capability for adequate 
cognitive functioning and the capability for the development of social skills. Thus, it may be 
objected, although healthy play functioning is likely an essential part of the development of 
social and cognitive capabilities, these capabilities must, at least to some minimal degree, also 
be a precondition for engaging in healthy playful activities in the first place.  
This objection is important in many ways. Not least because it reminds us that the 
capability for childhood play is not “the Big Bang” of human development. Some basic 
prerequisites must be in place even before the engagement in childhood playful activities. For 
example, we cannot just ensure children with severe mental disabilities the capability for play 
and then expect them to develop themselves to cope well with their impairment in a given 
social setting. In other words, my argument here for the ontogenetic importance of play does 
not assess “play” as a sufficient but merely as a pro tanto necessary condition for the 
development of skills useful for tackling social deficiencies.  
With these qualifications in mind, let me turn to the empirical evidence that grounds 
my conclusion that childhood play has status as an ontogenetically important fertile 
functioning, which informs us that the protection of the capability for play should be a central 
political goal in our efforts to target clusters of social deficiencies. 
 
Play for affiliation  
The interaction with other children through the practice of playing has a major impact on the 
individual child’s development of the capability to participate in social life later in life. Studies 
within child-psychology and pediatrics provide evidence that playful activities provide for 
children the opportunity to acquire empathetic emotional skills; perspective taking skills; they 
learn how to cooperate and share; to form groups and identify instances of unfairness 
(McElwain and Volling, 2005; Pellegrini and Smith, 1998; Hurwitz, 2002; Ginsburg, 2007). 
These skills are crucial for being able to understand social norms in a communal context and 
therefore for a person’s capability for belonging.  
Through playful activities children investigate social norms and discover how rules 
work, when they apply and when they do not. Playful activities at a young age enable children 
to acquire these necessary social skills (Lindsey and Colwell, 2003). Children are in this way, 
as Sally Hurwitz puts it, “natural anthropologists who have a need and desire to investigate 
the world through real experiences and natural environments” (Hurwitz, 2002: 101). And this 
is what they do in playful activities. They learn how to behave in a social setting, how other 
people react to the way they behave, what it means to belong to a group and how that matters 
(Gray, 2011). All these empirical studies provide strong support to the conclusion that the 
functioning of playing in childhood is of central importance to the development of the 
capability for affiliation. However, much more needs to be said here, since it is apparent that 
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not all kinds of play are equally fertile in this way. You might easily imagine types of harmful 
play that will limit rather than enhance social skills, which informs us that we should be 
protective of particular kinds of play (McElwain and Volling, 2005; Ginsburg, 2007). However, 
this does not threaten our general conclusion here that the capability for (some types of) play 
has ontogenetic importance for the development of the fertile functioning of affiliation.  
 
Playing to sense, imagine, and think  
One other dimension of the wide-ranging good development effects of childhood play is the 
development of cognitive capacities. Many scholars of child psychology and mental 
development link the acquirement of cognitive skills to the activity of playing at a young age. 
Empirical studies show that childhood play contributes to verbalization (Weisberg, et al., 
2015), the ability to focus and to keep concentration, management of and control over 
impulses, imagination and curiosity (Bedrova and Leong, 2003). These are all necessary and 
fruitful capacities for educational purposes. This leads interestingly back to the fertility of the 
capability for sense, imagination, and thought emphasized by Wolff and de-Shalit, as we saw 
above that they attached especially to the role of education. Now, we can add on the basis of 
the empirical studies that children’s learning abilities in school are also affected by playful 
functioning. As several studies conclude, children learn better in a classroom setting when 
routinely given recess and opportunity to participate in playful activities (Barros, Silver, and 
Stein, 2009). Thus, importantly, if education is so crucial for accessing other valuable 
functionings, as argued above—at least in the sense that lack of education represents a 
corrosive disadvantage—then the evidence of the importance of playful functionings for 
educational skills gives us further reason to emphasize the ontogenetic importance of play.   
 
Playing to gain control over one’s environment  
Ability to influence your environment is also highly influenced by skills learned through 
childhood play. The social street-smarts captured in the conception of “soft skills” that Wolff 
and de-Shalit emphasize within the category of control over one’s environment are very much 
developed through childhood interactive practices. Skills such as making decisions, 
negotiating and seeking compromise, and solving conflicts are practiced repeatedly through 
playful activities (Mainella, Agate, and Clark, 2011; Ginsburg, 2002: 183). Also the more subtle 
inherent social abilities such as social intuition and how to appropriately react and respond 
to other people’s behavior are being developed in the playground. In a nutshell, children are 
here learning how to play “social chess” (Bailey, 2002). Many of these skills are intertwined 
with or overlap with the skills I discussed above as fertile for affiliation (empathy, social 
cooperation skills etc.), but point importantly in another direction. All the social skills 
highlighted here seem to provide basis for understanding the tactics of social life and are 
thereby crucial for knowing how to “work the system.” Recall that this was one of the central 
issues in Wolff and de-Shalit’s account of control over one’s environment. Again, then, there 
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seems to be strong empirical support to the conclusion that also in regard to the fertility of 
this functioning, play has ontogenetic status. That is, if the absence of people’s capability to 
have control over their environment due to a lack in internal capacities works as a corrosive 
disadvantage, then we have strong reasons to prevent this through enhancing early childhood 
capabilities for play. 
In sum, empirical evidence suggests that the capability for play in childhood has 
ontogenetic importance for the development of capabilities for fertile functionings such as 
affiliation; sense, imagination, and thought; as well as control over one’s environment. If we 
agree with Wolff and de-Shalit’s analysis, as we have good reasons to do, we should target 
clusters of social deficiencies by designing our social policy to prevent corrosive disadvantages 
and enhance fertile functioning. The ontogenetic status of the capability for childhood play 
implies that protecting this capability is a core goal in social policy. 
 
Some considerations 
The above section argued that the capability for childhood play has ontogenetic importance 
for the other fertile capabilities and thus should play a significant role in the social political 
project of targeting clusters of social deficiencies. This concludes my central argument.  
Now, it might be objected the value of childhood play is already widely recognized as 
non-instrumentally valuable, and therefore we need not bring this requirement under the cap 
of political and social institutions of the welfare state. But this I think is false. The insights on 
play’s importance for social capabilities is highly salient even in rich countries, and while the 
value of play is widely recognized, its development potential is often neglected. Play activities 
in school have historically been separated from learning activities, although this has changed 
over the last decade not least thanks to the insights of play’s development contributions 
(Anderman, 2002; Bedrova and Young, 2003; Barros, Silver, and Stein, 2009). Similarly, in 
diagnostics and treatment of child diseases, it has traditionally been ignored how important 
it is for children to engage in playful activities (Singh, 2008). Upon the conclusion of my 
argument here, we must not take play for granted. We need to take seriously our societal 
responsibility for the protection of childhood play.   
Another possible objection is that the capability for play is not merely important in 
childhood but also throughout adulthood. In any case, the item of play on Nussbaum’s list is 
not limited to children, since it entails in very general terms, “being able to laugh, to play, and 
to enjoy recreational activities” (Nussbaum, 2000: 79; 2011: 34). And although what “play” 
essentially account for in adulthood is very likely to differ from childlike playful activities, it 
is plausible that the capability for play, laughter, fun, relaxation in general is similarly 
important for adults. Having leisure time; room for relaxation; the freedom to take part in 
social life; to play sports are all important opportunities to be included in a meaningful adult 
human life. It might even be argued that the opportunity for relaxation and playful activities 
also in adult life has beneficial effects on other capabilities, and should thus likewise be taken 
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as a fertile functioning. This consideration suggests that play is important throughout human 
life and thus emphasizes the objective, non-instrumental as well as instrumental value of play. 
This, however, does not disturb our conclusion here that there is something critical and 
special about the protection of childhood play, due to the ontogenetic character of this 
capability in that it serves to develop, at an earlier stage in life, the capabilities to other fertile 
functionings. Very likely—though hard to prove—childhood play is also ontogenetically 
important for the development of the capability for adulthood play.  
Another worry one might have is that the argument here seems to suggest that play is 
the most central capability on the list, which is unfortunate because it draws attention away 
from more basic capabilities such as life, bodily health, bodily integrity. Nussbaum’s list was 
not intended as a tool for assessments of social policy but as a universal list of human 
entitlements meant to serve as an informational basis for human development studies. Thus, 
importantly, the list has a global outlook in which the importance of the capability for play 
fades in comparison to more fundamentally basic entitlements. This is indeed an important 
consideration. If our aim is to eliminate deficiencies, then we must never neglect or 
underestimate the importance of very basic capabilities. Whatever else is important, basic 
capabilities must play first fiddle. But the argument here is not that we ought to focus on the 
capability for play rather than on life, health, bodily integrity. Surely, some capabilities are so 
fundamentally important that without them, nothing else matters.6 The argument here is that 
once these capabilities are adequately protected—and thus there is a further human life to be 
developed—the capability for play during childhood carries central political importance due 
to its ontogenetic status. This is the case in social policy as well as in global development 
initiatives; yet focusing here on how to target clusters of social deficiencies, the ontogenetic 
mechanism becomes that much more present, because the deficiencies in question are more 
likely to concern complex rather than basic capabilities. 
 
What kind of play? 
If childhood play has ontogenetic importance, then we have strong reasons to protect 
children’s capability for play. This is as far as my argument here can take us, but we have not 
hereby reached any conclusion about which social policy initiatives to pursue. One pressing 
question is what kind of play? Childhood play can take various forms and very likely not all of 
them are equally beneficial for developing certain personal capabilities (Sutton-Smith, 1997: 
3-5). It is reasonable to think of childhood play in general as a family-resemblance construct 
of different types of playful activities including object-centered play such as playing with 
building blocks; fantasy-centered play such as pretend games and role-play; physical play such 
as climbing or dancing; and social play such as sports or rule-centered games (Weisberg, 
                                                            
6 See also footnote 3 for this point.   
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Hirsh-Pasek, and Golinkoff, 2013; Pellegrini and Smith, 1998; Hurwitz, 2002: 102).7 Of course, 
playful activities often include more than one of these elements. Playing soccer in the park, 
for example, is both a physical and a social form of play, and may include fantasy elements 
too, if you (as I did in my childhood) imagine yourself as the World Cup Final game-breaking 
goal scorer, and the sound of wind blowing through the trees to be excited spectators 
celebrating the beauty of your play. So, the distinction made here between different types of 
play is unexclusive and very likely not exhaustive.  
The different forms of playful activities all seem to entail important elements of 
children’s development, although they might have different outcomes in terms of which 
personal traits they facilitate. Object-centered play enhances ability to focus and concentrate; 
fantasy-centered activities facilitate imagination and creativity; physical play strengthens 
children’s self-confidence and understanding of their own limitations; and social play 
facilitates empathy and understanding of fairness, social rules and regulations. Of course, not 
all playful activities are constructive in this sense. In fact, you can easily imagine some forms 
of play through which children may develop unwanted or even vicious personal traits. This 
has, for instance, been a worry about young boys’ overuse of violent computer games. 
Moreover, as some sociologists point out, even given a satisfactory universal definition 
of play is implausible, because it is a natural part of the playful activity to invent itself in 
repeatedly new creations, forms and shapes, which is always bound to the very specific context 
within which the activity is exercised. Hence, as famously pointed out by Sutton-Smith, play 
activities are often best described as potential forms of being, or models for identity, that are 
reflections of and created out of the given social and cultural context of the children, rather 
than as a predefined set of activities (Sutton-Smith, 1977). Upon this, Allison James argues 
that a useful understanding of what childhood play is, can be achieved only through a social-
anthropological analysis of play in actual children’s lives in different social and cultural 
settings (James, 1998). This understanding of play as a form of being, and trying out identities 
tied to contextual experience, however, fits nicely the language of the capability approach in 
which Nussbaum originally fleshed out the importance for justice of securing the capability 
for play. And thus, while this important sociological insight enables us to see that much more 
than the philosophical argument given here is needed in order to formulate actual realizable 
policy-recommendations, it is not a threat to my positive argument. If anything, it serves to 
confirm that childhood play—vaguely defined as it must be here—is a natural and necessary 
part of any childhood, regardless of culture, class and circumstances. 
And although we cannot reach concrete policy initiatives upon this generic positive 
argument, it follows from it that if the capability for childhood play is a political and social 
good that we have objective reasons to secure for everyone in the name of social justice, then 
the protection of this capability must take high political priority—although of course not 
                                                            
7 This vague categorization of play types build upon the taxonomy including 15 types of play, developed by 
Hughes (2002); see also Meire (2007).    
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absolute or lexical priority. That will sometimes (and probably often) imply that we can justify 
enforceable paternalist policies with the aim of protecting childhood play—that is, even if this 
is against the will of the particular child’s family. How controversial such cases will be is a 
political question. Upon my argument, these policies will be morally justifiable when they 
serve the purpose of securing the child’s flourishing in childhood and protect it against long 
term social vulnerability.  
Another related concern, which arguably might turn out to be much more salient and 
problematic on a societal scale, is when certain structural social norms about different types 
of play socialize children into stereotypical categories. This is the argument of Barrie Thorne 
in Gender play: Girls and Boys in School (1994). Here, Thorne emphasizes that children’s 
playful activities are in effect gendered so that the type of play that a specific child can practice 
in a specific social arena such as the playground is already presupposed by preexistent norm-
based expectations in that social environment (Thorne, 1994: 157). These norm-based 
conditions for play heavily influence children’s capabilities for different types of play; thereby 
forcing gender-specific direction upon their social development. 
Thorne’s argument leads us to the conclusion that gender plays a significant role as a 
constrainer on children’s opportunity for specific types of play through systemic norm-based 
expectations. If this analysis is correct, we should take gender into account in our design of 
the social circumstances under which children play, so that we can limit the effect of gender 
on play-related development, when this effect is negative. To what degree the effect is in fact 
negative, and when it is, is beyond the scope of this article. And what more specifically to do 
about it is a question that requires much more than a theoretical argument—in terms of both 
scientific and public deliberation.   
This reminds us that play is not necessarily always good in itself (Meire 2007). In fact, 
even benign types of playful activities that are in general very developmental might have the 
unfortunate side effect of steering children’s development into stereotypical categories that 
in themselves reproduce social inequalities. In such case, we might have strong political 
reasons to try to work against these effects. But this is no threat to our general conclusion 
here. As we are interested in enhancing and protecting children’s development of central 
capabilities, it follows that we should target our effort to those playful activities that serve this 
purpose. The general message here is that social policy should embrace the psychological and 
sociological knowledge of the fertile outcome of different forms of play and seek to bolster 
children’s development of central capabilities through protecting their capability for 
participating in all relevant forms of play. This is the central conclusion of my argument about 
the ontogenetic importance of play. 
So, different forms of play might have differential impacts on child development, which 
is important to keep in mind when designing social policy because we want our children to 
develop a wide range of capabilities—and especially for affiliation; sense, imagination, and 
thought; and control over one’s environment. This is a universal conclusion. But there is 
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another important distinction to make about types of play relating to differences in social 
background. As Annette Lareau has forcefully shown, children from different social classes 
experience completely different patterns of play and everyday free-time. Working class 
children’s play tends to be much more child-driven and spontaneous without much structure 
and adult guidance. In comparison, middle class children generally have a really well-
structured everyday frame and schedule for play and free-time activities (Lareau, 2011). This 
grounds the more particularistic conclusion that we need to take careful stock of specific 
children’s social context in which their playful activities are unfolded in order to fully 
understand how a political initiative can be properly designed to protect their particular need 
for play-catering development. This does not imply that working class children’s way of 
playing is necessarily worse or less developing than middle class children’s. In fact, the 
spontaneous child-driven forms of play are very fruitful for the development of creativity and 
imagination. But it informs us that the particular context of the child must be taken into 
account. The central political goal must be that children are experiencing a broad variation of 
types of play in order to fully develop and enhance the central necessary capabilities for 
affiliation; sense, imagination, and thought; and control over one’s environment. 
 
The argument restated 
This article has provided the following three-premise argument. First, the case for being 
concerned with clusters of deficiency has been grounded on two separate types of normative 
reasoning. The pluralist sufficientarian reasoning suggested that there are functionings so 
central to human life that any deficiency in any such functioning will necessarily be unjust, 
and that clusters of deficiencies within this list of functionings are therefore immensely 
problematic from the point of view of justice. Further, the social-egalitarian reasoning said 
that although singular instances of deficiency might not be that troublesome, justice should 
be concerned with clusters of deficiency because such clusters create social class structure 
and uphold systematic inequality between them. Together, these two strands of reasoning 
give us a strong normative reason to oppose clusters of deficiency. Second, the argument 
proceeded by showing—on the base of wide-ranging empirical evidence—how social 
deficiencies tend to cluster and that this makes ground for two important and parallel political 
strategies: the enhancement of fertile functionings and the prevention of corrosive 
disadvantages. I then argued alongside Wolff and de-Shalit that affiliation; sense, imagination, 
and thought; as well as control over one’s environment are fertile functionings and (or) their 
absence are corrosive disadvantages. I called this middle-part of the argument the fertile-
functioning premise. Third and finally, I claimed that childhood play has ontogenetic 
importance because the successful development of the capability to achieve the other fertile 
functionings relies on the early childhood capability to engage in healthy and diverse playful 
activities. This claim was backed by empirical evidence from pediatrics and child psychology 
and is thus not a freestanding intuition, but a well-known (yet often overlooked in political 
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science) empirical fact. This ontogenetic importance of play premise informs us that the 
protection of the capability for childhood play is a central political goal, and that although 
this does not tell us much about what, more specifically, we need to do, it does point out that 
in so far as we have as a political aim to target clusters of social deficiencies, play shouldn’t be 
ignored, as it holds a key role in the enhancement of fertile functionings and prevention of 
corrosive disadvantages.  
As a consequence, we need to carefully consult insights from child psychology and 
pediatrics in our social policy initiatives. Moreover, how to design an appropriate policy on 
how to secure play is a difficult matter, that requires answers to many political, sociological, 
and cultural questions. Further studies must explore those questions. They are beyond my 
purpose here, which was to reach the conclusion that we do have strong political and social 
reasons to protect children’s capability for play. Lane Kenworthy hints at this in his study of 
job inequality, as he shows a significantly lower degree of cognitive inequality in the North 
European countries than in Anglo countries. “While it is conceivable”, he notes, “that the 
latter group of countries started with more cognitively diverse populations, and that this 
diversity has simply been passed across generations via genetic transmission, it seems likely 
that nongenetic factors play a sizable role in the cross‐country difference in inequality of 
cognitive skills. To the extent those factors can be altered, it may be possible for countries to 
engineer reduced cognitive inequality—whether via public childcare or other means” 
(Kenworthy, 2008: 204). As my argument here has progressed, and as the empirical evidence 
from pediatrics and child psychology suggests, we have strong reasons to believe that securing 
successful child development of central social and fertile capabilities through the protection 
of childhood play would be one such necessary means.  
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